Pussy Riot yet another example of how art is pitted against politics

For Newsmill.se: The enormous attention that the indictment against Pussy Riot has created in both Russia and internationally is an example of an increasingly widespread global trend, where politics and art are pitted against each other and the reactions of society become a part of both art and politics.

Yesterday, a two year's prison sentence was passed in Moscow against three members of the Russian "punk band" Pussy Riot. The trio was found guilty of "hooliganism motivated by religious hatred." Reactions and condemnations against the sentence are manifold in both Russia and internationally, as it is evident that the penalty is not proportional to the alleged crime.

On 21 February this year - merely weeks before the Russian presidential elections - Pussy Riot made a mimic performance in front of the altar of Christ our Saviour Cathedral in Moscow wearing balaklavas and brightly coloured dresses. Within minutes they were seized on by security guards and thrown out of the church. Shortly thereafter, a video clip of the performance was published on YouTube, where music with a provocative song-text had been added. This so called "Punk prayer" was in the form of an invocation to the Holy Mother to drive out Putin and the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Kirill I, was portrayed as putting faith in Putin before that in God.

Undoubtedly, it was this video clip rather than the performance itself that made the Russian state and church react, as it spread like wildfire on the Internet. In March, three of Pussy Riot's members were arrested, while a fourth is still hiding from authorities. The lawsuit that has dragged out for almost half a year has now been accordingly finalised, where the treatment of the prosecuted has cast new light on Russia's legal decay. A mere 2.7 % of people prosecuted by Russian courts in 2011 were acquitted. 

The entire affaire has undeniably gained dynamics of its own, so one may assume that yesterday's verdict departs from the need of power to set an example. The increased confindence in the Russian legal system in recent years has thereby been turned into a setback in the politically directed jurisprudence, which since the process against former oligarch Khodorkovsky goes by the name of Basmanny justice. The trial against Pussy Riot has however taken the debate a step further, and several Russian liberal writers have compared the case with the show trials of the soviet era. The playback performance Pussy Riot made in Christ our Saviour Cathedral has thus also given rise to a historical playback.

It is also Russia's lack of due process that has caused reactions both in Russia and internationally. Already in April, Amnesty International characterized the members of Pussy Riot as prisoners of conscience. International organizations and artists are now joined by western public opinion, where the verdict against Pussy Riot become a symbol for all that is wrong with Russia. In this context, both strong and equally diverse  Russian reactions shuold be brought to the fore. A number of opinion polls during the process have shown both strong support for dismissing the case and for a guilty verdict. Russian public opinion is divided and varied in relation to a complex issue that has come to address religion, ethics, and politics more than actual law. 

That many believers in Russia have rightly felt offended by Pussy Riot's performance is beyond doubt, but this has been depreciated by the fact that a tasteless provocation has been overshadowed by an even more tasteless legal process. When the Russian Orthodox Church, in its condemnations of a feminist "punk band", has compared feminism with satanism, the Orthodox Patriarch, Kirill II, appears as the foremost representative of a patriarchic society. 

Then, what is Pussy Riot and what is it all about? Let us first put a myth to rest. Pussy Riot is not a punk band. It is a feminist art commune, dedicated to performance art in a wide sense, where provocation is a means to gain attention. 

Pussy Riot originates from the Russian street-art group Voina, which has produced a number of provicative and politically charged art projects. For the presidential installation of Medvedev in 2008, Voina made the performance "Fuck for the heir, Pussy Bear!", where five couples from the group - including a heavily pregnant woman - engaged in public group sex in the Moscow Museum of Biology, which was videotaped and published on the Internet. In 2010, the - then divided - group painted a giant phallos on a bascule bridge opposite the security service headquarters in St. Petersburg, where the result of raising the bridge should be obvious. Several members of Voina have previously been arrested for art projects. One of the now convicted women of Pussy Riot used to be a prominent member of Voina. 

The enormous attention that the indictment against Pussy Riot has created in both Russia and internationally is an example of an increasingly widespread global trend, where politics and art are pitted against each other and the reactions of society become a part of both art and politics. A parallel may e.g. be drawn to China's repression of the artist Ai Weiwei. In Sweden, the performance art project "Okänd kvinna, 2009-439701" of art student Anna Odell met with strong negative reactions the other year, not least from politicians. One should remember that Odell was sentenced to pay 50 day-fines for "dishonest conduct".It is far from a rule that artistic freedom of expression - as in the case of Lars Vilks' Mohammed roundabout dogs - gains strong public support. 

In this context, the perspective is not a comparison between preconditions of art in authoritarian and democratic states, but instead of how the margins of freedom of expression are tested as an effect of art regardless of the character of society. Thereby, the mechanisms of power and authority are illustrated - hopefully with different results in various political systems. That many of both Voina's and Pussy Riot's actions would be subject to public prosecution in most countries is evident. However, what differs is the legal process and the harsh sentence of the three members of Pussy Riot.

The lawsut against Pussy Riot can only be characterized as a travesty of justice. The law against hooliganism that motivated the verdict has such a broad definition that it may more or less cover all "crimes" perpetrated in public space. Hooliganism has however so far not been applied to "crimes" related to religion. If one would have wanted to prosecute the group on religious grounds, the law against extremism would have been applied instead, which e.g. covers acts to incite ethnic or religious hatred among groups in Russian society. However, the Russian constitution is secular, why application of the law against extremism in such a high-profile case, could have resulted in questioning of its compatibility with the constitution. Already in the choice of law, it is obvious that the process has been politically directed and motivated. Where Pussy Riot has claimed politics, the court has claimed religion as motive for the action. By interpreting the law in such a way that defamation of religion may constitute hooliganism, the court avoids applying the more politically chared law against extremism. Thus, paradoxically, the intent of the court appears clearer than that of the convicted, as an avoidance at any price to represent the process as what it actually is - a political trial. 

The question is also to what extent Pussy Riot has had to answer to the previous "crimes" of their art movement. Is it a case of collective punishment? Is it art itself rather than its practitioners that stands trial? From the freedom of expression perspective, these questions are both central and complex, but when art is political, they end up in the background. Instead, focus has been at the intersection of politics and religion in Russia.

The issue of relations between church and state is very sensitive in Russia. The Russian Orthodox Church has developed into providing both legitimacy and identity for political power. The church has subordinated itself to the state, in a way resembling the soviet era, at the same time as it supports reactionary forces within the regime - with a background within the security structures - which at times challenge both Putin and Medvedev. It is thus evident that the regime's internal political considerations have dictated the application of the law. For what Pussy Riot has done is to pinpoint Russia's politico-religious symbiosis.

During the soviet era, the Orthodox Church was strictly directed by the KGB. The Russian journalist Yevgeniya Albats e.g. claims that some half of the clergy in reality were agents of the KGB. Inter alia, the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church until 2008, Aleksy II, served the KGB for many years and made decisive steps in his career by denouncing opposition elements within the clergy. As Pussy Riot now sings about how the state and the church row the same boat, it is a political provocation that challenges mighty interests within Russian society, where relations between church and security interests are a taboo. The reactions of the church has therefore been powerful, but religiously motivated condemnations have carried a clear political undertone. The irritation is further exacerbated as Pussy Riot has compared themselves to Godly maniacs - a tradition of dissenters within Orthodoxy, which e.g. has manifested itself by crazy, but often tolerated, truthsayers. The truth said by Pussy Riot is however too stark for the church, and the parallel to Godly maniacs has thus been portrayed as further evidence of the group's disrespect for religion.

A danger in the process against the Pussy Riot trio lies equally in simplyfying and complicating the case. The simple approach, to consider the trio's destiny merely as political persecution, obscures more complex issues on how far society may allow art to go in its various expressions. To the contrary, the danger of complicating the case, lies in ascribing the group greater artistic qualities than it actually possesses. A rather simplistic art performance has here been regenerated and magnified by the mechanisms of politics and media.

How generously or narrowly the margins of artistic freedom of expression should be drawn is a question that concerns us all and lacks simple answers. However, Russia has for long stepped over the limits of what a purportedly democratic state can allow itself in curtailing civil liberties and human rights. In this context, Pussy Riot has had to pay a disproportionate and exceedingly high price for art as political provocation. In essence, the verdict against Pussy Riot can be summarized by the famous thesis of German author, Kurt Tucholsky: "A country is not just what it does, but also what it tolerates." In Russia, this thesis has been put to the test, and the result stands out as a strongly negative indicator of the country's continuous authoritarian decay.

Paving Political Potholes

For Global Voices Online: Say the word "roads" to most Russians, and you are likely to end up with an half-hour discussion. Throughout history, Russia has been infamous for its bad road quality. However, now Russian provincial city of Yekaterinburg seems to have come up with a solution to the problem, by making bureacrats get down to work. 

Being a road engineer in Russia must be a nightmare. The combination of harsh climate, mud and marshlands, with annual frost and thaw, makes the upkeep of many roads next to an impossible task. During spring, some roads simly float off. Recently, Russian roads were ranked 125 out of 139 in the world by the World Economic Forum 2011-2012 Global Competitiveness Report. 

One might assume that most Russians would have resigned to the task, but, whereas in a country like Canada, with similar conditions, few eyebrows are raised, in Russia roads have become a stain on national pride, in man's constant struggle to tame the forces of nature. Thus, last year, then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced a massive road construction programme, to double the rate of building. 

As with most overambtitious plans, Russians exercise some sound skepticism to its realization, and instead are beginning to take matters into their own hands, such as is the case in Yekaterinburg - Russia's fourth largest city. 

"Make the bureaucrat work" is the slogan of a local campaign [ru] run by the regional Internet news agency, Ura.ru. Their solution to the road problem is as simple as it is elegant: They simply spray-paint the portraits of local dignitaries around potholes, with their quotes of promises to fix the problem, and guess what - problem solved! What has taken local politicians years not to do, is now done overnight. The embarrassment of having their portraits so concretely fixed to the potholes of their power, has seemingly made authorities run about like mad to pave over their portraits of impotence, filling the holes in streets and roads.

So, what have been the reactions in Russian social media? 

Tweeter @ekalmurzaeva shouts out [ru]:

Вот как заставляют работать чиновников! Портреты чиновников помогли отремонтировать дорогу.

That's how to make bureaucrats work! Portraits of bureaucrats helped repair the road.

LJ user salvatoreha underlines the efficiency of the campaign, but also points out [ru] that it was not a one-hit overnight victory for the campaign:

Напомним, что художники нарисовали на дорогах городских чиновников, причем ямы и пробоины попадали им в рот. Акция оказалась не только эффектной, но и эффективной. Сначала коммунальные службы закрасили рисунки либо удалили слой асфальта. Ночью авторы оставили дополнительное граффити «Закрашивать – не чинить!» К утру коммунальщики полностью заделали все дыры.

Remember how artists painted city officials on the roads, with pits and holes filling their mouths. The action proved not only effectful, but also efficient. At first, municipal services either painted over the pictures or removed a layer of asphalt. At night [campaign] initiators left additional graffiti "Paint - don't fix!" By morning, municipality workers had fully patched all holes.

Others, like Yekaterinburg LJ user Ivan Dmitriyev, adds [ru] some local colour and humour to the affaire:

Десятки информагенств осветили данную акцию. Но в администрации города отнеслись с юмором к произошедшему, сказав, что Евгений Куйвашев собирается вечером гулять по городу пешком, и ему было бы любопытно взглянуть на одну из карикатур. Но кто-то из высокопоставленных коммунальщиков все-таки решил не травмировать психику родного начальника. Уже к следующему утру все дыры были залатаны, асфальт уложен, а лица, с кричащими ртами-ямами, были, следовательно, закрашены. Результат получен – дело сделано, дыр нет. Вот и благо для родного города. Видимо, когда чиновники закрывают глаза на городские проблемы, необходимо им их раскрыть, а к своему «лику» они, как показал екатеринбургский опыт, относятся трепетно.

Dozens of news agencies highlighted this action. But the city administration reacted with humour to what had happened, and said that [Governor] Yevgeny Kuyvashev was to take an evening stroll through the city, and that he was curious to take a look at one of the charicatures. But some senior municipal official still decided not to traumatize the psyche of his local boss. Already by next morning all holes were patched up, asphalt laid, and the faces, with screaming mouth holes, were consequently painted over. The result was achieved - done deal, no holes. What a blessing to one's hometown. Apparently, when bureaucrats close their eyes to city problems, it is necessary to disclose them, because to their own "ranks", as the Yekaterinburg example shows, they remain in awe.

What is not said, is often more interesting than what is actually said. Critical voices to the "Make the bureaucrat work!" campaign are hard to find in social media. As noted by one blogger, even attacked politicians appear to look positively on the action, making their bureaucracy get down to work. 

As a matter of fact, the method seems so efficient that one wonders how long it will take before the campaign is taken to a countrywide scale, possibly by the lively Russian motorists' movement. As Russia's legislators and police clamp down on political rights these days, perhaps this campaign indicates the growth of alternative popular action, a spontaneously evolving civil society, aimed at solving actual problems in people's everyday lives.

Medvedev and the "Belarusian Circus"

For Global Voices Online: A picture says more than a thousand words, the saying goes. An Instagram snapshot that the Russian PM Dmitry Medvedev tweeted as a tacit comment to his visit to Minsk sure does: the "Belarusian Circus." 

During Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Minsk on Wednesday, July 18, he tweeted [ru] an Instagram snapshot with the comment: "In the streets of Minsk." The problem with the picture is that it portrayed the Belarusian State Circus, which could be interpreted as a tacit comment on Medvedev's meeting with the Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko and senior state officials. 

 Medvedev's visit to Minsk was no courtesy visit. A recent smuggling scandal has aroused much anger in Moscow, and Medvedev used the meeting to bring Lukashenko to account for the export of chemical solvents produced from the Russian supplies of duty-free oil. Another item on the agenda, according to RIA Novosti [ru], was the recent intrusion into Belarusian airspace by a Swedish plane dropping teddy bears with anti-Lukashenko slogans. The bear incident was a major embarrassment for Belarus in view of the two countries' joint air defence system. As a consequence, a student [ru] who published a photostory about the bears, and a 16-year-old girl [ru], who allegedly took a photo of one of the bears, got arrested by the KGB.  

Then, how did social media react to the "Belarusian circus"? Twitter user @minssk united [ru] the two themes of the circus and the teddies:

Медведев прилетел в Минск, сфоткал цирк. До этого прилетали медведи, тот ещё цирк был, но с фотографом там не хорошая история получилась.

Medvedev flew to Minsk and photographed a circus. Before this, bears flew in, which was quite a circus too, but the story with the [detained] photographer wasn't good.

Some, like @Dubovnik_Dmitry, turned to sarcasm [ru] when commenting:

Медведев отметил минский цирк твитом:-) видно для того чтобы подчекнуть куда он приехал.

Medvedev mentioned the Minsk circus in a tweet:-) obviously to underline what kind of place he had come to.

Twitter user @daphnis_nerii assumed [ru] a more ironic tone:

Информационные порталы страны разместили новость о том, что Медведев сфоткал цирк. Что было бы, если б он в Беларуси в туалет сходил?

Information portals spread the news that Medvedev photographed a circus. How would it have been if he had gone to the toilet in Belarus?

Still, as Twitter user @yurok1521 asked [ru], the question on everyone's lips is this:

Медведев намекнул на «цирк» в правительстве Беларуси?

Did Medvedev hint that there is "a circus" in the government of Belarus?

What Medvedev's intention with the tweet was, only he knows, but if it was a joke, it testifies to a certain sense of humour of the former Russian president with the nickname 'iPhonchik'.

A Disgruntled Middle Class May Cause Putin's Fall

For Newsmill.se: Putin's inability to deliver on his promises sows the seeds to the civil society thay may cause his downfall. It does not suffice anymore to throw out bones to the middle class.


Yesterday, Russia headed to the polls with no real choice. The winner was predetermined. Putin moves in to the Kremlin again, this time with a six year mandate and an option for another presidential term until 2024. A quarter of a century with Putin however appears increasingly unthinkable. The reason is not popular protest, but because Putin's policy is passé. The soviet structural legacy has caught up with Russia and plans to solve problems turned into idle talk. Russians want what Putin cannot do. Instead, people choose their own solutions. Personal interest is turned into societal interest, and the seeds of civil society are sown. 

Largely, Russian challenges reflect western, in terms of an aging population, deficient infrastructure, environmental problems, health and education, but on a much deeper level. Consequences of decades of lacking investment become all the more intrusive into Russian everyday life. Politics turns into an arena of what one must do, and not what one wants. When what one must is not possible, power turns irrelevant for the citizens.

Few things in Russian societal discourse has been discussed with such obsession in recent years as all the plana that necessarily must be realized to meet the challenges of the future. Plan succeeds plan, but results are lacking and the country is sliding deeper and deeper into stagnation. Plans have made politics a prisoner of its own rhetorics, and reality has overtaken Putin in his zeal to catch up. The result is threading on in the same old tracks until running in circles. In practise, there has been a single political priority - stability - that has crowded out all plans for change. Putin's political stability thus paradoxically leads to the opposite - political instability. 

Some events define a regime regardless of whether perceptions are real or not. For Putin, it was terrorism and coloured revolutions. Thus, the play of circumstances set preconditions for an entire political era. Thus, a pathological obsession with internal and external enemies has turned Russian politics insane. Thus, fears of a flawed perception of reality arise. Because when threat turns into norm, the desire for normality rises. The western threat appears as paranoia. Terror becomes all the more tragic when authorities fail - as in Beslan and at the Dubrovka theatre - to deal with it, with an increasing sense of powerlessness as a result. The power of habit is great and the mantra of threat makes realities unreal when rhetorics turn danger into myth. Everyday threats become more real than those of the world, when causes of accident, unhealth, and insecurity are found in the inactivity of a state that self-centredly reflects itself in its own greatness instead of creating a better society for its citizens. 

Because it is a state that grows and grows but is capable to do less and less. When urgency is growing, it is not the state that puts down the fire. This realization grew during the great wildfires that ravaged central Russia during summer 2010. The state not only stood idly by faced by catastrophe, but withheld information that in too many cases could determine life or death to the public. The silence from authorities in connection to major accidents and disasters previously experienced now assumed massive proportions. However, people refused to passively stand by and watch their homes burn to the ground, and instead voluntarily joined together to fight approaching danger, e.g. with the use of social media. Information about the fires was gathered, fire-fighting coordinated and fighting equipment purchased - all on the initiative of ordinary people. The inactivity and incapability of the state forced people to voluntarily help each other. Society turned out to be greater than the state. 

The 2010 fires have ignited a flame that glows brighter and brighter in Russian sosciety by various big and small efforts. Many small and inconspicuous initiatives have been made previously. It may e.g. be policemen and security servants, who informally try to fight corruption and flaws within their own professions. It may be motorists, who inform each other about the corruption of traffic-police. Examples are growing in numbers, and so far it is more a matter about disclosing than fix the flaws and failures of society. What is decisive is that this type of citizen initiatives are not fundamentally political, or at least not perceived as such by participants and surroundings. You simply wants to solve the concrete problems that sorrounds you in everyday life. However, the effect is political in a way are difficult to master by state and authorities, because how does one accuse peole who merely want to improve their country. Many are patriots and honest people. Many also support Putin and his regime.

Here, the Internet has become both a tool to find likeminded people and to build platforms for information and action. It is this type of ideas and initiatives that the famous oppositional blogger Navalny has collected and built his fame on. Thereby, he has made the apolitical political, and turned apathy into sympathy for a spontaneous movement, first with the aim to achieve free and just elections, and then to depose of Putin. The same type of Internet platforms that previously were used to report fires are now used to coordinate voluntary election observation and to report irregularities and fraud at the ballots of Sunday's presidential elections. 

This is a development, which is hard to curb. To crack down on the opposition in the aftermath of elections is one thing. To crack down on those who only wants to do good is a completely different matter. As logics and mechanisms of citizen initiatives are the same, it is next to impossible for the regime to distinguish friend from foe. Already the protests planned for Monday may put the loyalty of police and security service to its test. Opposition demonstrations have gradually turned into festivals. To meet people with violence and brutality is something one for good reason hesitates to do, and it is probably seen as a last way out, both because of the message it would send and for fear of losing control over developments. Even if the opposition gathers masses in the tens or hundreds of thousands, demonstrations only affects relatively few. Many simply do not understand or care what it is all about.

Sunday's elections may not change Russia on the surface, but at its dephts it is a society that gradually is changing at its core. We are witnessing the growth of Russian civil society. Its significance should not be exaggerated, but neither should it be underestimated as both the plan and the rules of the game are changing. The discontent of a growing middle class must be taken seriously and the forms and contents of politics change when people organize. It does not suffice to throw bones around every now and then. Citizens want to sit at the tables of power in a way Russian politics do not understand. It is a question of power over everyday life, about close and concrete problems. Who is in the Kremlin is less important, but power must understand that the needs of the people must be reckoned with. The people deserves to be taken seriously and the needs of society cannot constantly come last in turn. 

Are we then witnessing the end of the Putin era? The truth is that there are no good answers. Still, the Kremlin's communicative disaster in relation to a discontent and protesting middle class cannot go on, as it is now increasingly assuming the forms of political schizophrenia. The middle class mania of power is a constant theme of societal discourse. Now, the middle class is regarded as preservers of society and a self-interested guarantee for continued stability. Now, it is seen as movers of society and a source of Russian reform policies. Now, it is portrayed as subverters of society and traitors, when it demonstratively makes reasonable and righteous demands on politics. At length, the effect is that power turns the middle class away from itself, adds to uncertainty and insecurity, and makes the unthinkable thinkable - a Russia without Putin. Because the more the Kremlin fear propaganda adds to the image that Putin is the only alternative to chaos, crisis, and war, the less serious and credible will he appear as a politician. Propaganda risks turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy, and the personalization of Putin into an icon of a Russia in decay.

The rifts in Putin's coulisses grow and it becomes increasingly difficult just to patch up. Through the growing holes nothing and no-one is seen. The future scenery is dark and gloomy, against a towering warfare backdrop. Many also remember how Putin once sprung out of nothing onto the scene to play the lead role in more than a decade's Russian politics. A new cast for the play may by extension not be excluded, even if it is improbable that the curtain will drop for Putin. Still, it is a changed country that now emerges. We may not trust Russia, but does that mean that we do not trust the Russians when people now rely on their own abilities instead of state stagnation. When Russians are not given any choice, they make their own choices.